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ABSTRACT
There has been a surge of interest in using machine learning (ML)
to automatically detect malware through their dynamic behaviors.
These approaches have achieved significant improvement in detec-
tion rates and lower false positive rates at large scale compared with
traditional malware analysis methods. ML in threat detection has
demonstrated to be a good cop to guard platform security. However it
is imperative to evaluate - is ML-powered security resilient enough?
In this paper, we juxtapose the resiliency and trustworthiness
of ML algorithms for security, via a case study of evaluating the
resiliency of ransomware detection via the generative adversarial
network (GAN). In this case study, we propose to use GAN to
automatically produce dynamic features that exhibit generalized
malicious behaviors that can reduce the efficacy of black-box ran-
somware classifiers. We examine the quality of the GAN-generated
samples by comparing the statistical similarity of these samples to
real ransomware and benign software. Further we investigate the
latent subspace where the GAN-generated samples lie and explore
reasons why such samples cause a certain class of ransomware classi-
fiers to degrade in performance. Our focus is to emphasize necessary
defense improvement in ML-based approaches for ransomware de-
tection before deployment in the wild. Our results and discoveries
should pose relevant questions for defenders such as how ML mod-
els can be made more resilient for robust enforcement of security
objectives.
KEYWORDS
Dynamic ransomware detection, generative adversarial net, adver-
sarial quality metric.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ransomware is a type of malicious software (malware), which hi-
jacks and blocks victim’s data or machine until a monetary ransom
is paid. Its life cycle consists of six phases [42]: i). Distribution: the
ransomware arrives at victim’s machine by an email attachment, a
drive-by download or a code dropper; ii) Infection: the ransomware
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installs itself to survive a reboot and disables shadow copies or anti-
virus processes; iii). Communication: the ransomware contacts its
Command and Control (C&C) server for the encryption key; iv)
Preparation: the ransomware scans the user’s files, usually pdf, docx,
jpg files; v). Encryption: the ransomware encrypts the selected user
files; and finally vi) Extortion: a “ransom note”, asking for payment,
is displayed to the user. After the ransom is paid, instructions to
receive the decryption key will be sent to the user.
There are two main categories of ransomware based on attack
approaches: the locker-ransomware and the crypto-ransomware [9,
26]. The locker-ransomware locks the victim’s computer without the
encryption. The crypto-ransomware encrypts victim’s files which
are very difficult to revert. The quick solution is to pay the extortion
and hope the given key can truly decrypt the data. Thus the crypto-
ransomware remains a notorious security issue today. In our case
study, we focus on cryto-ransomware.
The popularity of Internet and untraceable payment methods and
availability of software development tools makes ransomware an fea-
sible weapon for remote adversaries [1]. In recent years, ransomware
has posed increasingly major threats. Since 2017, ransomware at-
tacks have increased over 59% yearly with 35% growth in Q4 2017
alone. Although the trend of devising new ransomware has declined
in 2018, the occurrence of ransomware attacks is still rising [40, 41].
Dynamic analysis on malware can reveal true malicious inten-
tions by executing malware in a contained environment. Recent
research have found behavior analysis via analyzing API calls, reg-
istry accesses, I/O activities or network traffic can be effective for
ransomware detection[9, 19, 26, 29, 34, 46, 53].
Faced with a tsunami of malware attacks, the security indus-
try are employing machine learning (ML) to automatically detect
threats and enhance platform security. Their confidence in ML is
not ungrounded. ML algorithms have demonstrated state-of-the-art
performance in the field of Computer Vision (CV), Natural language
Processing (NLP), Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR). The suc-
cess of ML has generated huge interest of applications on platform
security domains for automated malware detection[15, 16, 51, 56].
Particularly for ransomware detection, algorithms such as naive
Bayes, support vector machine, random forest, logistic regression
have shown good classification efficacy [2, 47, 57]. Shallow or deep
neural networks also demonstrated high effectiveness at ransomware
detection [4, 18, 59].
Recent research take advantage of opaqueness of NN algorithms
and generate subliminal perturbed input examples which have shown
to evade ML based detection. These types of emerging attacks,
where an adversary can control the decision of the ML model by
small input perturbations, expose a broad attack surface. Although
most of the Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) publications
[7, 10, 11, 21, 31] focus on misclassification on CV and ASR do-
mains, the proliferation of adversarial examples are spreading to
generate sophisticated adversarial malware. These examples per-
form real-time evasive attack by camouflaging malicious behavior
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to a legitimate software while keeping maliciousness intact and fool-
ing detection during run-time. For example, AVPASS[32] generates
potent variations of existing Android malware by querying and in-
ferring features used by malware detection systems. Additionally
recent research have shown promise of ML-based approaches to
thwart ransomware attack on user systems [19, 54].
The malicious use of ML motivates us to properly study the ad-
versarial attack threat models and investigate the robustness and
vulnerability of ML-powered security defense systems. In this paper,
we present a case study on using deep learning to automatically
bypass ML-powered dynamic ransomware detection systems. We
propose a framework based on generative adversarial network [27]
to generate dynamic ransomware behaviors and a set of adversar-
ial quality metrics to justify the generated samples indeed persist
maliciousness. We discover that most of the selected highly effec-
tive ransomware classifiers fail to detect the adversary-generated
ransomware, indicating a broad attack surface for ML-powered se-
curity systems. We thoroughly examine the latent feature space to
understand where the adversarial examples lie. We believe that our
proposed framework is useful for the defender system to incorporate
and minimize their detection algorithms’ blind spots. Our case study
examines the roles of ML as both a good cop and a bad cop for
platform security.
The goal of our paper is to provide a framework to understand the
resiliency of ransomware detectors. We do not enable a true attack
on user system. As demonstrated in this paper, we advocate that a
defender should fortify their ML models for ransomware detection
via adversarial studies.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) Although generative adversarial network (GAN) has been
used to generate fake samples to resemble the true data distri-
bution, our framework is the first one to study ML resiliency
via GAN to automatically generate dynamic ransomware be-
haviors. Although our experiments illustrated that ML mod-
els are highly effective in combating real-world ransomware
threats and can achieve high classification accuracy up to 99%
accuracy with extremely low false positive rate, our results
show that such ML models fail to detect the GAN-generated
adversarial samples. To stabilize training and achieve conver-
gence, we utilize data segmentation techniques and auxiliary
conditional GAN architecture.
(2) We propose a set of adversarial quality metrics to validate the
generated adversarial ransomware and demonstrate the GAN-
generated samples via our framework maintain maliciousness
verified by such metrics. Although our ML classifiers mis-
classify these adversarial samples as benign, the adversarial
samples are statistically much closer to real ransomware sam-
ples.
(3) We emphasize that robustness against adversarial samples
is an equally important metric in addition to accuracy, false
positive rate, true positive rate, F1 score to thoroughly evalu-
ate ransomware detection scheme before deployment. In our
experiment, only one of the seven models has the strongest
resiliency on the GAN-generated samples, indicating a broad
adversarial attack surface of ML algorithms. On the other
hand, our experiments provide guidance for security practi-
tioners to develop resilient ML algorithms proven to defend
against adversarial attacks.
(4) We study the reasons why the highly effective models are
susceptible by properly investigating in the latent feature
space and provide understanding of the blind spots of these
models. We present our learning to generate awareness to the
security community that adversarial threat models need to
be properly evaluated before deploying ML models to detect
malware attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec 2 briefly pro-
vides the background on ransomware analysis, adversarial machine
learning and generative adversarial network. Sec. 3 describes system
architecture, data collection and pre-processing. Sec. 4 presents our
proposed framework and adversarial quality assessment procedure.
Sec. 5 illustrates experimental results on our dataset.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Ransomware Detection
Cabaj et al. [9] use HTTP message sequences and content sizes to
detect ransomware. Morato et al. [46] analyzed file sharing traffic
for ransomware early detection. Scaife et al. [53] provide an early
detection system by monitoring user data changes including the file
entropy and similarity changes, the file type changes, file deletion
and file type funneling. The honeyfiles-based R-Locker system is in
[26] to trap and block ransomware operations. When ransomware
scans user’s file system and accesses pre-installed decoy files, the
R-Locker service is triggered to apply countermeasures. The “Un-
veil” system introduced in [34] can detect crypto-ransomware via
the I/O access patterns. A Windows kernel I/O driver is developed
to collect I/O operations and buffer entropy. It provides an early de-
tection capability on a zero-day ransomware. Continella et al. create
ShieldFS [19], a custom kernel driver that collects and performs
analysis of low-level file-system activity to classify ransomware
activity at runtime using a multi-tier hierarchical decision tree based
process monitoring model. ShieldFS also integrates file back-up to
its ransomware detection system so it can able to recover files from
a trusted secure storage after confirming malicious activity. Sgan-
durra et al. [55] proposed "EldeRan" which dynamically analyzes
Windows API calls, registry key operations, file system operations,
directory operations and so on in a sandboxed environment, selects
relevant features and finally applies a logistic regression classifier
to determine whether an application is ransomware or benignware.
In contrast to monitoring system executions proposed in "EldeRan",
we have focused on collecting changes in user file events which
demonstrated early indication of ransomware activity, helped pro-
cessing and storing limited data and finally worked under very lim-
ited computational budget in order not to interfere with users regular
computational needs. Scaife et al. proposed CryptoDrop [52], an
early stage ransomware detection system which made use of file
event changes rather than program execution inspection through
API call monitoring. Although they have used different ransomware
behavioral indicators compared to our file events, they have reached
the same conclusion as ours that an union of indicators is a more
effective approach in ransomware detection than any of those alone.
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2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
The first adversarial machine learning attack is used against spam
filtering by generating adversarial text without affecting content
readability [20]. The topic got significant attention in the security
community when Szegady et al. [58] fool a DNN based image recog-
nition classifier by adding low-intensity perturbations to the input
image which looks indistinguishable to human eyes. Adversarial
attacks on CV typically add small human imperceptible perturba-
tions to the original images and have shown to drastically alter the
ML boundary decisions [28], [37], [49], [45], [12]. Beyond CV, [13]
generate adversarial speech to change the output of a speech-to-text
transcription engine. Adversarial malware are created to bypass ML
detection while keeping maliciousness of the software intact [32].
Defense techniques including pre-processing via JPEG compres-
sion [22, 23], feature squeezing [61], architecture via regularization
[33], adversarial training [38], neural fingerprinting [24] have ex-
hibited success to mitigate the proliferating adversarial machine
learning attacks.
2.3 Generative Adversarial Network
The first generative adversarial network (GAN) ever introduced is a
fully connected neural network architecture for both the discrimina-
tor and the generator [27]. Ever since, abundant GAN variants are
proposed. The Deep Convolutional GAN (DCGAN) [50] proposes
using strided convolutions instead of fully connected multi-layer
perceptrons and feature normalization to stabilize training and deal-
ing with the poor weight initialization problem. The Conditional
GAN (CGAN) [44] adds conditional setting to the generator and
the discriminator by making both neural networks class-conditional.
It has advantages to better represent multi-modal data generation.
The Laplacian Pyramid GAN (LPGAN) [25] produces high quality
generated images and uses multiple generators and discriminators in
its architecture. It downsamples the input images, and during back-
propagation, injects noise generated by a conditional GAN and then
upsamples the images. Auxillary Classifier GAN (ACGAN) [48] im-
proves the training of GAN by adding more structure to the GAN’s
latent space along with a specialized cost function. Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN) [5] uses Wasserstein distance as the loss function to ef-
ficiently approximates the Earth Mover distance and significantly
reduces the mode dropping phenomenon.
Generative adversarial network has been used in creating adver-
sarial examples to fool ML. [60] trains a conditional GAN algorithm,
AdvGAN, to generate perceptually similar adversarial input images
to attack state-of-the-art defense methods [39]. [30] uses a method to
generate adversarial malware samples using MalGAN to attack state-
of-the-art black-box ML detection algorithms. [3] demonstrates cre-
ation of domain generation malware instances (DGAs) using GAN
to bypass modern DGA ML classifiers such as random forest. [6]
proposes using GAN to model the malicious behaviors and gener-
ate synthetic malware representation which is trained with existing
malware samples for effective zero-day threat prevention on ML
detectors. [35] proposes tDCGAN using unsupervised deep auto-
encoding technique to generate new malware variants based on raw
codes and modified features.
Figure 1: The major ransomware families in our dataset. The
distribution is based on the labels provided by Microsoft in
VirusTotal.
Figure 2: A diagram of behavior data collection system. The
robot, a Windows PC, will execute a binary downloaded from
the Control server. The execution log is uploaded to the Data
storage. Power Control can shut down robots if needed.
3 RANSOMWARE DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1 Data Collection and Description
In our analysis, the ransomware samples are downloaded from Virus-
Total, where we collect submitted ransomware between late 2017 to
early 2018 based on tags from Microsoft and Kaspersky. The dataset
contains various of ransomware with nine major families including
Locky: a Microsoft Office macro based ransomware, and Cerber: a
product of ransomware-as-a-service. The ransomware family distri-
bution is seen in Figure 1.
The samples are executed in a regular Windows system as shown
in Figure 2. The dynamic behaviors are collected via the .Net frame-
work FileSystemWatcher (FSW) API. The callback functions bound
with FSW are triggered for all file I/O operations. We collect the
low-level I/O activity patterns and calculate the normalized Shannon
entropy of the targeted files [53]. To catch evasive ransomware, a
user activity simulation program is executed to emulate mouse clicks
and key strokes. To mimic an active desktop environment, a Notepad
and Office Word applications are launched before and during ran-
somware execution. The benign data is collected manually from
installing and executing approximately a hundred applications from
various categories such as office suite, browsers and file compression
applications. The idle I/O activities of benign Windows system are
collected for a few months from regular backups, updates, anti-virus
applications and so on.
Each data collector robot, as seen in Figure 2, is pre-installed
with several user files such as Windows Office, text or multimedia
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files. These files are designed to be the target of ransomware and
used as decoy files to filter active ransomware samples. If these files
are modified during execution, then this sample is assumed to be
a “crypto-”ransomware and then collected to the malicious dataset.
All behavior data are uploaded to Resilient ML platform [62] for
data cleansing. The names of the decoy files are appended with time
stamps before ransomware execution, so each sample will see the
same set of user files but with different file names.
3.2 Feature Mapping
The collected execution log via FSW contains time stamp, event
name, targeted file name and file entropy, as seen in Figure 3. We
attempt the least effort of feature processing by mapping the event
combined with entropy change. The four main file actions are file
delete, file create, file rename and file change. The entropy level is
combined with the event of file change. Hence each execution log
is represented by a sequence of events. We set the length for each
sample to be 3000, so that the shorter length samples will be padded
with zeros towards the beginning to match the dimension. Table 1
shows the feature mapping.
Figure 3: A screen shot of dynamic execution log collected using
FileSystemWatcher (FSW).
Events Feature encoding
Padding 0
File deleted 1
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0.9, 1] 2
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0.2, 0.4] 3
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0, 0.2] 4
File created 5
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0.8, 0.9] 6
File renamed 7
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0.4, 0.6] 8
File content changed and entropy ∈ [0.6, 0.8] 9
Table 1: Feature mapping. We attempt the least effort of feature
processing, categorize the events into 9 categories and use zero
for padding maintain the same length. Our features contain var-
ious I/O events and entropy change.
The patterns from both I/O event types and entries of target file
constitute our feature set. The benign programs, such as WinZip,
may have change events with high entropy, but they will not have as
many rename or delete I/O events as typical crypto-ransomware. On
our collected dataset, combining various I/O event types and entropy
as features is effective to detect ransomware.
4 SYNTHESIZING DYNAMIC FEATURES VIA
GAN
GANs are mostly used in computer vision to generate images that
seem real to the human eyes. Because they are typically used in
CV, one can terminate the training when the generated images look
like the real images. The inputs in our case study, however, are
dynamic execution logs, so it is not practical to stop training GAN
by merely visualizing the generated samples. Furthermore when
we directly employ the typical training mechanism of GANs, mode
Figure 4: Overview of our proposed framework using GAN to
generate dynamic ransomware features to bypass detection.
collapsing issues constantly arise. The challenges of training an
effective GAN to fool the ransomware classifier motivate us to
propose a different GAN training scheme for faster convergence and
better-quality sample generation.
The principle of our proposed GAN training scheme is to seg-
ment the dynamic execution logs and leverage transfer learning to
accelerate training convergence. Each execution log is segmented
into m subsequences and then converted 2-dimensional arrays. Then
transfer learning is employed such that the parameters and neural
network architectures are borrowed from existing and successfully
convergent GANs used in the vision domain, while we still train
from scratch on the fixed architecture. The effectiveness of employ-
ing transfer learning from computer vision to malware classification
is previously demonstrated for both static and dynamic malware clas-
sification [14, 15], but not yet for adversarial malware generation.
4.1 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary has knowledge to the training data,
but no knowledge at all of the underlying ransomware classifiers.
This is a realistic assumption since for malware detection, anti-virus
vendors obtain their training samples from VirusTotal, which allows
users to download binaries or hashes.
4.2 Training Procedure
Our approach essentially consists of segmentation and reshaping as
preprocessing, GAN training, quality assessment, concatenation and
evaluation. An overview of our framework is seen in Figure 4.
4.2.1 Segmentation and reshaping as preprocessing. We
observe that, in our initial experiments, GAN did not converge when
trained on the entire logs. This motivates us to consider training a
convergent GAN on log segments. After feature mapping, we divide
each training execution log into sequences each of length 784. If
the length of the execution log is not divisible by 784, the end of
the last subsequence will be padded zero. Each subsequence is then
reshaped into two-dimensional square arrays of 28 × 28.
We note that the convergence issue may be resolved through
searching the space of neural network architectures and the param-
eters. However our preprocessing step enables transfer learning to
borrow existing convergent GAN architectures, hence saving exhaus-
tive search efforts while still achieving convergence.
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4.2.2 Training. The generative adversarial networks (GAN), first
introduced in [27], are paired neural networks consisting of a gener-
ator and a discriminator, which act like two players to win a game.
The generator produces samples from the generated distribution PG
which is to be as close as the real data distribution PR . The dis-
criminator classifies whether the samples are generated by PG or
truly sampled from PR . The purpose of the generator is to fool the
discriminator and the purpose of the discriminator is to separate
the fake from the real. At the end of the training, the generator is
supposedly and theoretically to maximize fooling the discriminator.
We train an auxiliary classifier generative adversarial network
(ACGAN) on the segmented two-dimensional arrays processed from
the execution logs. The ACGAN architecture we employed from
computer vision is shown in Figure 5. Denote each real sample
as r ∈ R ⊂ R28×28, where R is the space containing all the real
segmented execution logs. The paired data are drawn from the joint
distribution (r1,y1), (r2,y2), ...(rn ,yn )
i .i .d∼ PR,Y , where y ∈ Y are
the class labels with Y = 1 being ransomware and Y = 0 being
benign.
Denote each generated sample as д ∈ F , where F is the space
containing all fake samples andд is drawn from the generated sample
distribution д ∈ PG . Let random variable C denote the label for data
source where C = 1 means the data is real and C = 0 means the data
is fake. The entire data denoted by X consist of both real and fake
samples, i.e., X = R ∪ F .
We denote z as the noise generated by the generator G, which
is a function G : (z,y) 7→ д. Given the data X , the discriminator D
calculates two probabilities: whether the data is real or fake P(C |X )
and the class label of the sample P(Y |X ). The loss function of AC-
GAN comes into two parts:
LC = E(logP(C = 1|R)) + E(logP(C = 0|F )), (1)
and
LY = E(logP(Y = y |R)) + E(logP(Y = y |F )). (2)
The generator is trained to maximize LY − LC and the discriminator
is trained to minimize LY +LC . Adding the above auxillary classifier
to the discriminator in AC-GAN stabilizes training.
Because our threat model assumes the adversary has no knowl-
edge of the underlying classifier, the stopping criterion for training
our proposed mechanism only relies on the discriminator loss. How-
ever in a white-box attack where the adversary has knowledge of the
ransomware detector, the goal of the attacker is to cause the gener-
ated samples from the malicious class to be misclassified as benign.
Hence we can include a third term, with respect to the ransomware
detector, to the loss function as follows:
Ldetector = E(logPG (Yˆ = 0|Y = 1,C = 0)). (3)
The stopping criterion for training is the loss of the discriminator.
After training, we can generate both fake malicious samples Gm
and fake benign samples Gb . From an attacker’s perspective, it is
more desirable to generate malicious samples, bypass detection and
increase false negative rate. Hence we focus on Gm for subsequent
analysis and experiments. Each generated sample is of size 28 × 28,
so we flatten the sample to 1-dimensional segments of length 784
and round the generated sample to the closest integer value. For
abuse of notation, we denote this set as Gm .
Figure 5: The ACGAN architecture for generating reshaped ex-
ecution segments. Left table: the architecture of the generator,
where the input z is latent variable and the output д is a gen-
erated 2-D execution log segment. Right table: the architecture
of the discriminator, where the inputs are the 2-D execution log
segments, the output y ∈ Y is predicted as benign or malicious
via the auxiliary classifier, and the output c ∈ C is predicted as
real or fake.
4.3 Quality Assessment on the Generated
Malicious Samples
Unlike in computer vision where the quality of the generated samples
can be evaluated by visual inspection, evaluating the quality on
dynamic execution logs requires a quantifiable metric. We propose a
sample-based adversarial quality metric qi , where for each sample
i ∈ Gm
qi =
n1(i)
n2(i)
, (4)
where n1(i) = |Ni∩m |−|Ni∩m∩b |, and n2(i) = |Ni∩b |−|Ni∩m∩b |.
Here, |·| denotes the cardinality, Ni∩m is the set of matched n-grams
between the sample i and the malicious test set, Ni∩b is the set
of matched n-grams between the sample i and the benign test set
and Ni∩m∩b is the set of matched n-grams among the sample i, the
test malicious set and the test benign set. Passing the quality check
means that the generated samples contain more unique malicious
samples than the unique benign samples. Since the real test data was
not used for training the ACGAN, the proposed metric evaluates
the generalized malicious properties that may not be found from the
training set.
For a generated set Gm , we calculate the quality metrics for each
sample and filter the samples whose quality metric is below a pre-
specified threshold τ . Suppose we expect to generate K malicious
samples and K0 samples have q < τ . Then we regenerate a smaller
set of G
′
m , and repeat the process until we obtain K desired quality
samples.
Similarly for the entire set Gm , we propose a batch-based adver-
sarial quality metric Q to statistically summarize the set of qi for all
i ∈ Gm . The summary statistics are minimum, first quartile, median,
lower quartile, minimum and outliers.
We summarize the adversarial quality assessment procedure in
Algorithm 1.
4.4 Log Generation and Evaluation
The number of ways to concatenate the generated segments fromGm
is approximately ⌊m 3000784 ⌋. In our experiment, since all the segments
in Gm pass quality assessment, we can randomly concatenate the
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial quality assessment procedure
Input: Generated set Gm with |Gm |= K and quality threshold τ
Output: K − K0; G {m,q<τ }
Step 1: Calculate {q1, . . . ,qK }.
Step 2: Remove samples with bad quality q < τ . Denote the set
of bad samples by G {m,q<τ } where |G {m,q<τ }|= K0.
individual segments. We note that for even stronger attacks, the
attacker can optimize the concatenation based on some optimization
objective, and this is one of our next research steps.
The generated malicious samples, after quality assessment in Sec
4.3, are fed into the ransomware classifier. The adversarial detec-
tion rate is defined as the number of correctly predicted adversarial
samples divided by the total number of adversarial samples. From
a defender’s perspective, we can use the adversarial detection rate
as another metric to quantify how resilient the malware detector is
against adversarial attacks.
4.5 Summary of Proposed Methodology
In Algorithm 2, we summarize our framework of training ACGAN
to generalize dynamic ransomware features and using a set of quality
metrics to statistically evaluate the maliciousness of the generated
samples.
Algorithm 2 Generate dynamic adversarial logs to bypass ran-
somware detector.
Input: Desired number of generated malicious samples K , quality
threshold τ , training data
Step 1: Segmentation and dimension conversion.
Step 2: Train AC-GAN.
Step 3: Generate Gm such that |Gm |= K .
Step 4: Apply quality assessment procedure on Gm as in Algo-
rithm 1.
if K − K0 = 0 then
Stop
else
Generate Gm ′ with |Gm ′|= K − K0. Repeat until all generated
segments pass quality assessment.
end if
Step 5: Concatenation.
Step 6: Feed the logs into ransomware detectors.
5 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
5.1 Ransomware Classification on Real Data
Machine learning can be efficient, scalable and accurate at recogniz-
ing malicious attacks. We first demonstrate its benefits for highly
effective ransomware detection. The training and testing ratio is set
at 80% : 20%, where the training set contains 1292 benign samples
and 3736 malicious samples, and the test set contains 324 benign
samples and 934 malicious samples. After feature mapping, each ex-
ecution log is represented as a sequence of events, and the sequence
length is set to be 3000, where shorter sequences are padded with
zeros to ensure same length.
We consider several popular classifiers including Text-CNN[36],
XGBoost [17], linear discriminant analysis (LDA), Random Forest[8],
Naive Bayes[43], support vector machine with linear kernel (SVM-
linear), and support vector machine with radial kernel (SVM-radial).
For fair comparison, all classifiers are trained on the same sequences
and no further feature extraction such as n-gram is performed prior
to the classification algorithms. We note that the raw features are
not 1-gram modeling, which counts event occurrences. We report
the classification accuracy, false positive rate (FPR), true positive
rate (TPR), F1-score and area under the ROC curve (AUC) for all
selected classifiers.
As seen in Table 2, Text-CNN achieves the highest accuracy at
0.9890, low false positive rate at 0.03, highest true positive rate
at 0.9989, highest F-score at 0.9796 and highest AUC at 0.9950
among all other selected classifiers. XGB performs second best with
accuracy at 0.931 and lowest false positive rate at 0.023. All other
classifiers either suffer from low accuracy or high false positive rate.
However, we expect n-gram feature extraction will greatly improve
the other classifiers’ performance.
Due to Text-CNN’s superior performance, we naturally use it
as a feature extractor via the last pooling layer and retrain all the
other classifiers on the embedding extracted via Text-CNN. We
observe significant improvement of other classifiers composed with
Text-CNN, as seen in Table 3.
Classifier Accuracy FPR TPR F1-score AUC
Text-CNN 0.9890 0.030 0.9989 0.9796 0.9950
XGB 0.9308 0.023 0.7963 0.8557 0.8869
LDA 0.5048 0.574 0.7698 0.4077 0.6136
Random Forest 0.9348 0.213 0.9861 0.9497 0.8866
Naive Bayes 0.8704 0.250 0.9122 0.7488 0.8457
SVM-linear 0.4420 0.074 0.3587 0.4906 0.8130
SVM-radial 0.7417 0.997 0.9979 0.0061 0.9055
Table 2: Classification performance on the test set. Text-CNN
achieves the highest accuracy at 0.989 and low false positive rate
at 0.03 among all selected classifiers. XGB performs second best
with accuracy at 0.931 and lowest false positive rate at 0.023. All
other classifiers either suffer from low accuracy or high false
positive rate.
Classifier Accuracy FPR TPR F-score AUC
XGB ◦ Text-CNN 0.9841 0.0032 0.9475 0.9685 0.9722
LDA ◦ Text-CNN 0.9865 0.0494 0.9989 0.9731 0.9977
Random Forest ◦ Text-CNN 0.9833 0.0556 0.9968 0.9497 0.9706
Naive Bayes ◦ Text-CNN 0.9666 0.1111 0.9936 0.9320 0.9906
SVM-linear ◦ Text-CNN 0.9881 0.0432 0.9989 0.9764 0.9974
SVM-radial ◦ Text-CNN 0.9897 0.0228 0.9957 0.9797 0.9993
Table 3: Classification results on the test set. All the classical
classifiers performance improve significantly using Text CNN
as a feature extractor.
It is only worthwhile to evaluate the resiliency of a highly ef-
fective ransomware classifier. Based on Table 3, the high effective
ransomware classifiers are Text-CNN, XGB◦ Text-CNN, LDA◦ Text-
CNN, Random Forest ◦ Text-CNN, Naive Bayes ◦ Text-CNN and
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Figure 6: Class-conditional density plot for each dimension in
Text-CNN feature space. Red denotes the malicious class and
blue denotes the benign class. Text-CNN as a feature extractor
helps separate the samples from two classes, as indicated by the
density plots. The features extracted from Text-CNN are in R32.
Figure 7: ROC curves of XGB, LDA, SVM compared with
XGB◦ Text-CNN, LDA◦ Text-CNN and SVM◦ Text-CNN.
When using Text-CNN as a feature extractor and retraining
XGB, LDA, SVM in the Text-CNN embedding subspace, all the
composed classifiers possess significantly higher classification
efficacy measured by AUC, F1-score, accuracy FPR and TPR.
SVM◦ Text-CNN. In our experiment results, Text-CNN, whether as
a classifier on its own or as a feature extractor, is most likely to be se-
lected by a security defender. Although knowledge of the defender’s
ransomware classifier is not needed by our analysis methodology,
we evaluate the adversarial detection rate against Text-CNN based
classifiers.
5.2 Generate Adversarial Segments
We follow the steps in Section 4.2.2 to train an AC-GAN [48], where
we set the batch size to be 100, the latent dimension to be 100,
and the training is stopped at the 80-th epoch. After training, we
obtain 5029 segments from the malicious class Y = 1. We round the
segments to the nearest integer and denote this set as Gm .
5.3 Adversarial Quality Assessment
A successful evasion means the generated malicious samples not only
fool ransomware classifier, but also persists maliciousness based on
certain metrics. Following Section 4.3, we compute the adversarial
quality metric q of each GAN-generated sample for n-grams with
n ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 7}. Figure 8 shows the quality metric in y-axis against
each generated segment in x-axis for 4-, 5-, 6-grams. We set the
Figure 8: Adversarial quality metric qte for 4-,5-,6-grams. All
the generated segments have qi ≥ τ , where τ = 1.5 and
min{qi } = 1.9. Hence the generated segments have minimum of
almost twice the unique malicious signatures than the unique
benign signatures for 4-,5-,6-grams.
Figure 9: Boxplots of Q to evaluate the generated batch quality.
All the generated segments have qi ≥ τ , with min{qi } = 1.9 for
all n ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 7}-grams.
quality threshold to be τ = 1.5, which means a qualified generated
segment with statistically measured maliciousness would need to
match over 50% of the unique malicious n-grams than the unique
benign n-grams.
We also plot the batch-based quality metricQ forn = {3, 4, . . . , 7}-
grams, as represented in boxplots in Figure 9. As shown in the box-
plots, all the generated segments are statistically much closer to the
real malicious class with qi ≥ τ and min{qi } = 1.9.
All the generated and qualified segments are concatenated ran-
domly to produce 1257 execution logs.
5.4 Evasion
The highly performing ransomware detectors Text-CNN, XGB ◦
Text-CNN, LDA ◦ Text-CNN, Random forest ◦ Text-CNN, Naive
Bayes ◦ Text-CNN, SVM-linear ◦ Text-CNN, SVM-radial ◦ Text-
CNN are applied on the adversary-generated logs. We report the
number of detected samples and the detection rate in Table 4.
Most of the classifiers significantly degrade in detection perfor-
mance, where Text-CNN, LDA ◦ Text-CNN, Naive Bayes ◦ Text-
CNN, SVM-linear ◦ Text-CNN fail to detect any generated malicious
samples, while XGB ◦ Text-CNN detects 12.73% correctly and Ran-
dom forest ◦ Text-CNN detects 36.35% correctly. The most robust
classifier turns out to be SVM-radial ◦ Text-CNN in this experiment
with 100% detection rate. This can be due to its nonlinear boundary
in the Text-CNN latent feature space. However only one classifier
out of all seven highly effective classifiers is resilient to our by-
pass scheme. Our adversarial detection result clearly indicates that
this is a potential vulnerability for ML-based ransomware detection
systems.
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Classifier No. detected Detection rate (%)
Text-CNN 0 0
XGB ◦ Text-CNN 16 12.73
LDA ◦ Text-CNN 0 0
Random forest ◦ Text-CNN 457 36.35
Naive Bayes ◦ Text-CNN 0 0
SVM-linear◦ Text-CNN 0 0
SVM-radial◦ Text-CNN 1257 100%
Table 4: Adversarial detection rate on the generated malicious
samples. Six of the seven highly effective classifiers degrade se-
verely in performance and only one classifier persists resiliency
against attacks. This quantifies the attack surface for these ML-
based ransomware detection algorithms. The non-linear bound-
ary of SVM-radial◦ Text-CNN effectively detects the adversar-
ial samples.
5.5 Latent Feature Space Investigation
We investigate why most of the highly effective classifiers fail to
predict the adversarially generated samples correctly. We use the
last pooling layer from Text-CNN as a feature extractor and refer
to the space of features extracted by Text-CNN as the latent fea-
ture subspace. The classifiers that achieve effective and competitive
classification performance are XGB, LDA, Random Forest, Naive
Bayes and SVM trained in the latent feature subspace. Text-CNN
the classifier itself has linear boundaries via the fully connected
layer in the latent feature subspace. Hence one natural investigation
starts at how the generated samples and the real samples relate in the
latent feature subspace induced by Text-CNN, in comparison with
their relationship in the original feature space, consisting of the raw
execution logs.
Represented in 2-D visualization, Figure 10 shows that the gener-
ated samples, in dark red, lie close to a linear boundary but much
closer to the real benign samples in the Text-CNN latent feature
subspace. However as shown in Section 5, most of the generated
samples match more than twice of the unique ransomware signatures
than the unique benign signatures. This motivates us to explore the
L2 distance between the real malicious samples and real benign sam-
ples, as well as between the generated samples and the real samples
in both the latent feature subspace and the original feature space.
Denote the latent features of the generated malicious logs as Fд ,
the latent features of the training malicious logs as Ftr,m and the
latent features of the training benign logs as Ftr,b . Similarly, for the
test data, the latent malicious and benign features are denoted as
Fte,m and Fte,b respectively.
We plot the density of the L2-distances between test malicious
data and training data, both of which are real samples. The left figure
in Figure 11 shows, in the original feature space, the density of
the L2 distance Dtr,te,m between the malicious test logs and the
training malicious logs in red and the density of the L2 distance
Dtr,te,b between the malicious test logs and the training benign logs
in blue. The dashed red and blue vertical lines represent the means
of Dtr,te,m and Dtr,te,b respectively. On average, the malicious
test logs are closer to the training malicious logs than to the training
benign logs. However in the original data space, the distributions of
Figure 10: Visualization of the Text-CNN extracted features for
(left) PC-dimension 1 vs PC-dimension; (middle) PC-dimension
1 vs PC-dimension 3; (right) PC-dimension 2 vs PC-dimension
3. The generated malicious samples are colored in dark red, and
lie closer to the benign set in Text-CNN subspace. We draw the
95% data eclipse around the scattered points.
Figure 11: Density plot of the distances between real benign
and real malicious logs in both original feature space and Text-
CNN latent feature space.
distances are not very well-separated and this is also reflected in the
algorithm performance on the original data space as shown in Table
2.
The right figure in Figure 11 plots the density of the L2 distance
dtr,te,m between Fte,m and Ftr,m in red and the density of the L2
distance dtr,te,b between Fte,m and Ftr,b in blue. The dashed red
and blue vertical lines represent the means of dtr,te,m and dtr,te,b
respectively. Fte,m is much closer to Ftr,m than to Ftr,b . The dis-
tances are consistent across original feature space and the latent
feature subspace. This observation is expected since the malicious
samples should be close together in either feature space.
Next we investigate whether the observed phenomenon extends
to the generated samples and real samples. The left figure in Figure
12 plots, in the original feature space, the density of the L2-distance
Dtr,д,m between the generated logs and the training malicious logs
in red and the density of the L2 distance Dtr,д,b between the gen-
erated logs and the training benign logs in blue. The dashed red
and blue vertical lines represent the means of Dtr,д,m and Dtr,д,b
respectively. The generated malicious logs are much closer to the
real malicious logs than to the real benign logs in the original feature
space.
The right figure in Figure 12 plots, in the latent feature space,
the density of the L2-distance Dtr,д,m between Fд and Ftr,m in red
and the density of the L2 distance Dtr,д,b between Fд and Ftr,b in
blue. The dashed red and blue vertical lines represent the means of
Dtr,д,m and Dtr,д,b respectively. Fд is much closer to Ftr,b than to
Ftr,m . Figure 12 shows that in the Text-CNN feature subspace, the
generated logs are closer to the benign logs, while in the original
feature space, the generated logs are closer to the malicious logs.
This phenomenon indicates that the generated adversarial samples
lie in the blind spot of the Text-CNN algorithm.
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Figure 12: Density plot of the distances between generated logs
and real logs in both original feature space and Text-CNN latent
feature space.
Figure 13: The flow to synthesize actual samples based on GAN-
generated I/O sequences. The goal to deploy our proposed sys-
tem is to use the generated samples for adversarial training and
improve model resiliency.
6 DEPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
We develop a ransomware simulation program to demonstrate how
to generate actual malicious file I/O operations based on the GAN
generated feature sequences, as seen in Figure 13. When the pro-
gram sees feature sequences such as “File rename”, “File created”
and “File change with high entropy”, it will rename an arbitrary
file, create the other arbitrary file and then encrypt a victim file. The
I/O events collected when executing the simulated ransomware is
very close to the GAN generated feature sequence, such that the
simulated ransomware can bypass ML detection while maintaining
malicious encryption behaviors. We make sure the I/O operations
are completed in a short time window to minimize noisy I/O events
added from other benign processes.
7 DISCUSSION
We describe a framework via generative adversarial network to
synthesize dynamic ransomware samples and propose a set of ad-
versarial quality metrics via statistical similarity to quantify the
maliciousness of the GAN-generated samples. We demonstrate that
six of the seven highly effective ransomware classifiers fail to detect
most of the GAN-generated samples.
In our next steps, we will continue developing an automatic tool
for monitoring applications and harvesting more benign logs. The
addition of benign samples can augment our training set to better
reflect the practical scenarios of more benign-ware than malware.
We also plan to test the real-world efficacy of our proposed adver-
sarial log generation system against the machine learning based
anti-malware solutions in the market. Additionally, while we hope
to extend our adversarial generation framework to semi-supervised
or unsupervised malware classification tasks.
the unsupervised ransomware detection algorithms were not con-
sidered in this paper. As many unsupervised machine learning algo-
rithms have been developed, how to properly access their resiliency
and trustworthiness is also important. In
Our proposed framework should be utilized as a defense capability
for developing a resilient model for detecting ransomware in the
field. As described in Section 4.4, a defender can use the adversarial
detection rate as a metric to quantify the resilience of the ransomware
detector against adversarial attacks. The defender can use the GAN-
generated samples as part of the training procedure to update the
defender’s classifier.
Our proposed quality assessment approach can be leveraged even
when the model is deployed and is in use in the field to track the
changes in distance between generated and real samples. These
robustness mechanisms must be considered as an integral part of an
adversary-resilient malware classifier.
Our case study for evaluating a broad range of ransomware clas-
sifiers also demonstrates the pitfalls in selecting classifiers based
on high accuracy and low false-positives which is typical today in
malware detection. After a deeper analysis of generating quality
adversarial samples, the most robust classifier is verified to be SVM-
radial◦Text-CNN in our experiment. This analysis may form the
basis of selecting multi-classifier ensemble-based approaches to act
as a defense-in-depth against adversarial probing attacks once the
ransomware classifiers are deployed in the field. In our specific case
study, a weighted score between the XGB◦Text-CNN classifier and
the SVM-radial◦Text-CNN classifier gives the defender much more
coverage in the space of execution logs for ransomware.
It is important to note that our framework is still useful to enforce
the resiliency of the ransomware detection model even when the
model is deployed on a platform using software and hardware-based
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that protect the run-time
confidentiality and integrity of the classifier(s) while in-use - provid-
ing the defender with an additional tool to continue to enforce the
security objectives consistently even post the training stages.
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